Presidential Tariff Authority 2026: Every Source, Compared
Not law as of September 15, 2026. H.R. 5334 — the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 — has passed the Senate and cleared the House Rules Committee, but the House has not voted on it and nothing has been signed. If it were enacted, Section 112 would require duties of up to 500 percent ad valorem on all goods from Russia within 30 days, and Section 113 would allow up to 100 percent ad valorem on goods from up to five other countries. Neither is Section 232, 301 or 338 authority, and neither is IEEPA.
What this would let the President do
Two new tariff powers, both switched on by enactment rather than by an investigation, and both layered on top of duties that already apply:
- Primary duty on Russia (§112). Within 30 days of enactment the President shall raise the duty on all goods from Russia to a rate of up to 500 percent ad valorem — expressly including oil, natural gas, LNG, petroleum, petroleum products, petrochemical products, coal and coal products — in addition to any other duty, fee, tax or charge. The bill sets no minimum rate.
- Secondary duties (§113). In the same 30 days, up to 100 percent ad valorem on all goods from up to five countries that knowingly make new purchases of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas on or after day 30 and were among the five largest importers by volume in the 12 months before enactment, plus a separate list of up to five countries that were among the top five facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion.
- Movement both ways (§113(b), §113(e)). USTR can adjust a secondary rate at any time between greater than zero and up to 100 percent on a written determination that the country took "significant steps" — to increase or to decrease its Russian purchases — and re-determines the top-five importer lists every 180 days with State and Energy.
- Exit ramps. A national-interest waiver (§115), termination on certifications (§117), and a 5-year sunset on the whole division (§203).
The mechanism: Sections 112 and 113 of the Senate-passed text
| Power | Trigger | Rate ceiling | Timing | Waiver, adjustment, sunset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| §112 — primary duty on Russia | Enactment. Automatic: "the President shall"; no investigation and no finding required | Up to 500 percent ad valorem, in addition to any other duty, fee, tax, exaction or charge | Not later than 30 days after enactment | §115 waiver on a national-interest certification; §117 termination on a Russia–Ukraine peace-agreement certification; 5-year sunset (§203) |
| §113 — secondary duty, purchase track | Country knowingly made new purchases of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas on or after day 30 and was among the 5 largest importers by volume in the 12 months before enactment | Up to 100 percent ad valorem, in addition | Not later than 30 days after enactment | §113(d) natural-gas exception; USTR may adjust to greater than zero and up to 100 percent (§113(b)); §115 / §117; 5-year sunset |
| §113 — secondary duty, facilitator track | Among the top 5 countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion in the 12 months before enactment | Up to 100 percent ad valorem, in addition | Not later than 30 days after enactment | §115 / §117 only — no gas exception and no 180-day reassessment on this list; 5-year sunset |
| §113(b) — rate adjustment | USTR written determination that the country took "significant steps" — to increase or to decrease Russian crude or gas purchases. The term is undefined | Greater than zero, up to 100 percent | At any time after initial imposition | Written determination to the appropriate congressional committees; 5-year sunset |
| §113(d) — gas exception | A country's Russian gas imports were less than 15 percent of Russia's total annual gas exports and it "has taken significant steps to reduce" them | Not a rate: 15 percent is a purchasing threshold, not a duty | Applies at imposition | "Significant steps" is defined nowhere in the bill; 5-year sunset |
| §113(e) — 180-day reassessment | USTR, with State and Energy, re-determines the 5 largest importers of Russian crude oil (HS 2709) and of natural gas (HS 2711) | Up to 100 percent under §113(a) | Not later than 180 days after initial imposition, and every 180 days thereafter | No counterpart for the facilitator list; 5-year sunset |
| §113(g) — advance report | Written justification to the appropriate congressional committees before imposing or modifying a secondary duty | No rate | Not later than 10 days before imposition or modification | Secondary duties only — §112 carries no reporting requirement; 5-year sunset |
How it compares with Section 232, 301, 338 and IEEPA
| Authority | What it covers | Rate ceiling | Trigger and administrator | Status today |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Section 232 — Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §1862 | Named products that threaten national security: steel, aluminium, copper, drones/UAS, polysilicon | None in the statute; 15%–100% in force by product | A Commerce (BIS) investigation, then a presidential proclamation | In force — metals at 50%, drones at 100%/25% since September 3, 2026 |
| Section 301 — Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §2411 | A foreign country's acts or policies: the China lists and the 60-economy forced-labor framework in force since July 24, 2026 | None in the statute; 7.5%–100% in force | A USTR investigation, determination and Federal Register action | In force |
| Section 338 — Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1338 | Products of a country that discriminates against US commerce | Up to 50 per centum ad valorem — the statute's own words | A presidential finding of discrimination by proclamation; the ITC reports under §338(g) | In force on Canada — proclamations July 20, 2026; import bans September 29, 2026 |
| IEEPA — 50 U.S.C. §§1701–1708 | Was used for emergency duties on any trading partner | None left: the Court held IEEPA authorises no tariffs at all | A presidential national-emergency declaration | Held unlawful February 20, 2026 — Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287 |
| H.R. 5334 §§112–113 (proposed) | All goods from Russia; all goods from up to five described countries | Up to 500 percent (Russia); up to 100 percent (secondary) | Enactment — automatic, no investigation; USTR reviews the list every 180 days | NOT YET LAW as of September 15, 2026 |
Why this is not Section 232, 301, 338 or IEEPA
- No investigation, no product list. Section 232 needs a Commerce finding about a product; Section 301 needs a USTR determination about a country's practices; Section 338 needs a finding of discrimination. This bill's trigger is enactment, and its scope is a country, not a product line.
- It stacks by design. §112(b) and §113(f) name the other authorities — Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, sections 122, 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, and section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 — and make the new duty "in addition to" each. Nothing in either section replaces an existing authority.
- The ceiling is outside the existing range. No section of 232, 301 or 338 produces a 500 percent rate; Section 338's own text caps it at 50 percent.
- It expires. The division terminates 5 years after enactment (§203, except §201), where 232, 301 and 338 carry no sunset. §201 separately extends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 from 2026 to 2031.
- IEEPA is a fourth source only historically. The Supreme Court held on February 20, 2026 that IEEPA does not authorise the President to impose tariffs, so any page still pricing IEEPA duties as live is out of date on that point.
- It does not repeal the 2022 ban. The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act (P.L. 117-109, April 8, 2022) bans all chapter-27 Russian products from importation outright, and the Senate-passed text contains no repeal or cross-reference — so those energy products stay prohibited rather than tariffed.
- It cannot reach anyone else. §113(h) provides that nothing in the Act authorises duties on goods from a country not described in §113(c) or from Russia.
Who is exposed
- Russia — the only country named in the tariff text: all goods, up to 500 percent, if the bill is enacted.
- Up to five purchase-track countries, named nowhere in the bill. The list comes from volume in the 12 months before enactment. The defeated Hoyer amendment would have named ten — China, India, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic — but the Rules Committee refused to make it in order (3–7, September 14, 2026), so no such list is in the bill.
- Up to five facilitator countries on a separate list, with no natural-gas exception and no 180-day reassessment.
- India and China are discussed, not named. Both are among the largest importers of Russian crude in public trade data, which is why they lead coverage. Cato's September 15, 2026 estimate of $408 billion a year assumed 100 percent duties on China, India, Türkiye, Slovakia and Hungary — Cato's own model on 2025 volumes, not a government figure. Any country list beyond the bill's text is inference.
- The EU is unresolved. CRS raises whether "country" can reach the European Union as a whole; the ordinary meaning disfavours it and the bill caps the number of countries, which "arguably precludes" a 27-member union.
What would have to change before it takes effect
- The House concurs in the Senate amendments by a single motion under H. Res. 1530. No amendment is in order, so the choice is concur or not, and the bill itself has not been voted on as of September 15, 2026.
- The President signs it. That is the trigger for everything below; the Federal Register currently carries no document about the Act.
- The clocks start. Section 112 and Section 113(a) duties fall due not later than 30 days after enactment, and the purchase test for the secondary list runs from day 30.
- Notice is filed. Not later than 10 days before imposing or modifying a secondary duty, the President or USTR must send the congressional committees a written justification (§113(g)).
- USTR reviews twice a year. The first re-determination of the five largest crude and gas importers is due not later than 180 days after initial imposition, and every 180 days after that (§113(e)), with rates adjustable at any time between greater than zero and 100 percent (§113(b)).
- It ends. The division terminates 5 years after enactment unless Congress acts (§203); §201 is the exception.
Questions importers and assistants ask
can the president raise tariffs without congress?
Yes — but only under authority Congress has already granted, and the grant fixes the ceiling. Section 232 (19 U.S.C. §1862), Section 301 (§2411) and Section 338 (§1338, capped at 50 percent) allow duties after an investigation or finding. IEEPA no longer does (Supreme Court, February 20, 2026). H.R. 5334 would add a fifth source.
what is the maximum tariff the president can impose on russia?
Up to 500 percent ad valorem — and only if H.R. 5334 becomes law. Section 112 of the Senate-passed text requires the President to raise duties on all goods from Russia to a rate of up to 500 percent ad valorem within 30 days of enactment. As of September 15, 2026 that power does not exist.
what are secondary tariffs?
Secondary tariffs fall on third countries for dealing with a sanctioned country, not on the sanctioned country itself. Section 113 of H.R. 5334 allows duties of up to 100 percent ad valorem on all goods from up to five countries that buy Russian crude oil or natural gas after day 30, or that were top-five sanctions-evasion facilitators.
is the russia sanctions tariff bill law yet?
No. As of September 15, 2026 H.R. 5334 is not law: the Senate passed it 86–11 on August 7, 2026, the House adopted the rule for it 214–211 on September 15, 2026, and no House roll call on the bill itself exists — the Clerk's highest 2026 roll call is 307, and none of those roll calls is on H.R. 5334. No Federal Register document mentions the Act.
Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act tariff authority 500%?
The 500 percent figure is the Section 112 ceiling on all goods from Russia. It is a ceiling, not a rate: the text reads “up to 500 percent ad valorem”, sets no minimum, and requires the increase within 30 days of enactment. H.R. 5334 is not law as of September 15, 2026, and its secondary duty names no countries.
H.R. 5334 House vote status?
The House has not voted on H.R. 5334 itself. It adopted the procedural rule, H. Res. 1530, by 214–211 on September 15, 2026 — Clerk roll call 300, previous question 214–208. That rule makes in order a single motion to concur in the Senate amendments, with no amendment in order, so the floor choice is concur or not.
presidential tariff authority Section 232 301 338 IEEPA?
Those four are no longer a complete list. Section 232 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962), Section 301 (Trade Act of 1974) and Section 338 (Tariff Act of 1930, capped at 50 percent) remain live; IEEPA was held not to authorise tariffs on February 20, 2026 (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287). A fifth source is proposed.
secondary tariffs countries buying russian oil?
No country is named in the bill. Section 113 draws the list from data: the five largest importers of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas in the 12 months before enactment, plus the top five facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion. The Hoyer amendment's ten countries were defeated 3–7 at the Rules Committee on September 14, 2026.
India tariff Russian oil sanctions bill 2026?
India is not named in H.R. 5334. It would be reached only through the bill's unnamed top-five volumetric test. India is discussed because it is a large buyer of Russian crude: Cato's own September 15, 2026 model priced 100 percent duties on China, India, Türkiye, Slovakia and Hungary at $408 billion a year — not a government figure.
What is still open — and what this page does not claim
- Every rate here is a ceiling. "Up to 500 percent" and "up to 100 percent" are the text's ceilings; §112 sets no minimum, and §113(d)'s 15 percent is a gas-import threshold, not a duty.
- The amendments were defeated, not pending. The Hoyer and Meeks amendments lost 3–7 at the Rules Committee on September 14, 2026 (record votes 411, 412 and 413) and H. Res. 1530 allows no amendment on the floor. They are history, not live alternatives.
- CRS flags what the text does not answer: "significant steps" is used twice and defined nowhere; whether §113(e) compels de-tariffing when a country drops out of the top five; whether §112 rates may be modified at all; and whether §113(a)'s 30-day deadline and §113(c)(1)(A)'s day-30 purchase test overlap by at most one day.
- No prediction. Nothing here forecasts whether the House concurs, and nothing has been signed as of September 15, 2026.
Last verified: September 15, 2026 (ET). Status was re-checked that day against the House Clerk's roll-call index (highest 2026 roll call: 307; none on H.R. 5334), the Rules Committee's H.R. 5334 page and the Federal Register API; the bill text read here is the Senate-passed text, byte-identical to the copy the evidence pass measured. This page describes a proposal and is not legal or customs advice.
Sources: H.R. 5334, Senate-passed text (govinfo) · CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11474 (September 3, 2026) · congress.gov action list · House Clerk roll-call index · House Rules Committee page · H. Res. 1530 · H. Rept. 119-825 · Senate roll call 224 · Senate roll call 223 · P.L. 117-109 · Supreme Court, No. 24-1287 · 19 U.S.C. §1338 · Cato Institute, September 15, 2026 (the $408 billion estimate) · Federal Register API
Related on this site: Section 232 metals: status by metal · Section 301 expansion across 60 economies · Section 301 on China · Section 338 and the delegation challenge · IEEPA tariff refund status · how the China stack adds up · US tariff rates by country · who pays the duty on entry · tariff revenue and who controls it · Tariff Calculator 2026